Bakersfield Municipal Airport, California

Location: The Bakesfield Municipal Airport is located 3 miles south of Bakersfield, California.

History:  Bakersfield Municipal Airport, known at the time as Oildale Field, or Bakersfield Army Air Field, was home to combat ready Army Air Forces fighter units tasked with defense of California in 1941.

After the first threat of enemy attack during World War II had subsided, the field was used as a sub base for Hammer Field in Fresno by the 4th Air Force for pilot training.

In 1945, new Jet powered YP-80As were delivered to the 412th Fighter Group for service tests.  The group was relocated to Santa Maria Air Field in 1945.

Bakersfield Municipal Airport Today: Intensive flight training; Helicopter and military operations;



Airport Services and Amenities: Fuel;  Air BP 100LL; Self service 24 hours; Kern Charter Service;

Special Events and Attractions:  Museum; Arena; Kern County Fairgrounds; Mesa Marin Raceway;

Airport Area Accident History:

Accident occurred Sunday, September 30, 2007 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/31/2007
Aircraft: Cessna 182F, registration: N3580Y
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.
The airplane porpoised on the runway while decelerating during a rejected takeoff. The pilot did not have the Cessna issued gust lock that fits into the hole in the control yoke. Therefore, he placed a machine bolt into the hole to keep the flight controls steady while he washed his airplane. During the pilot's subsequent preflight and pre-takeoff check he failed to observe that movement of the flight controls was restricted. During takeoff, as the airplane became airborne, the bolt's presence was discovered, and the pilot retarded the throttle. The airplane contacted the runway in a nose low attitude and porpoised, thereby bending the firewall and fuselage.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot's inadequate preflight inspection and pre-takeoff checks during which he failed to remove the gust lock.

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Accident occurred Wednesday, August 29, 2007 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/20/2007
Aircraft: Cessna 172S, registration: N3544Z
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.
In a telephone interview with the NTSB investigator-in-charge approximately 45 minutes after the accident, the student pilot reported that after landing on Runway 30R the airplane started to veer to the left. The student pilot stated that he was trying to correct back to the right "...but the right wing went up and the airplane went off the left side of the runway." The student pilot reported that the right main landing gear failed and the airplane came to rest in an upright position about 30 feet off the runway. The student pilot stated that there was damage to the right wing tip, the right horizontal stabilizer and the right elevator. The student pilot said, "I just lost control of the airplane." In an interview with the IIC, the airport manager revealed that the airplane had impacted a taxiway sign. At 0854, the on airport automated weather facility reported wind from 170 degrees at 4 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, sky clear, temperature 30
degrees C, dew point 12 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.87 inches of Mercury.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The student pilot's failure to maintain directional control of the airplane during the landing roll, which resulted in a collision with a taxiway sign.

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Accident occurred Tuesday, June 05, 2007 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 8/30/2007
Aircraft: Cessna T210N, registration: N6973N
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
The pilot reported that as he was turning on to base leg for Runway 30R he noticed that the wind was stronger than anticipated, and when established on final the wind had caused the airplane to drift to the right of the runway's centerline. The pilot stated that as he was making adjustments to line up with the centerline the air traffic controller instructed him to go around. As he was pitching up and adding power the controller then told the pilot he was cleared to land, prompting the pilot to reduce power, drop the nose, and continue to make adjustments for the crosswind. The pilot reported that when the airplane touched down it bounced two or three times, "...then a strong wind gust caused the plane to exit the runway to the right." As a result of the nose wheel collapsing aft the firewall sustained substantial damage. The pilot estimated winds from 270 degrees between 12 and 14 knots, with wind gusts to 18 knots.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot's improper flare, which resulted in a loss of directional control. Factors included the crosswind and gusty wind condition.

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Accident occurred Saturday, December 09, 2006 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/28/2008
Aircraft: John Lauer Harmon Rocket II, registration: N604JL
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
Witnesses reported seeing the airplane performing aerobatic maneuvers just prior to the accident. As the airplane was completing a loop, it impacted terrain in a wings level, nose high attitude. There was no evidence of pre-impact mechanical malfunctions observed during the subsequent examination of the engine or the control system that would have precluded normal operation.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot's failure to maintain terrain clearance during an aerobatic maneuver.

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Accident occurred Tuesday, July 18, 2006 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/31/2006
Aircraft: Beech A36, registration: N4785M
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.
The pilot made a hard landing resulting in substantial damage to the airplane. The pilot extended his downwind for landing at the destination airport with the intention of avoiding the wake turbulence produced by a jet departing the runway of intended use. While in the landing flare, the pilot stalled the airplane, resulting in a hard landing. The right main landing gear collapsed and the airplane rolled off the runway surface. The pilot reported no pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

the pilot's improper flare, which resulted in a hard landing.

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Accident occurred Thursday, November 17, 2005 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 3/28/2006
Aircraft: Piper PA-28RT-201, registration: N2863X
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.
The airplane landed hard on the displaced threshold of the runway while maneuvering on short final approach to properly align with the runway. The pilot reported that she had to make a slight s-turn to final approach to correct for overshooting the runway centerline. As she flared, the airplane would not respond to control input and impacted the displaced threshold hard and skidded to rest on the right side of and short of the runway. Air traffic controllers asked the pilot to make a short final for traffic considerations and she accepted the request. They observed the airplane overshoot the runway centerline and enter a steep bank in an effort to realign with final approach. The airplane descended rapidly and impacted the ground. Post-accident examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration airworthiness inspector, and a local mechanic, revealed no pre-impact anomalies with the airplane that would have prevented its normal operation. The
airplane sustained structural damage to both wings and the fuselage. The landing gear were sheared from the airplane.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

the pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed, which resulted in an accelerated stall and hard landing.

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Accident occurred Wednesday, May 25, 2005 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 8/29/2006
Aircraft: Bell 47G-4A, registration: N110DT
Injuries: 1 Serious.
The helicopter collided with power lines and crashed in a cotton field while conducting aerial application operations. The pilot completed his first pass from west to east across the north end of the potato field. As he came in for his second pass, the helicopter struck power lines that ran north and south along the west side of the potato field. The helicopter came down in an adjacent cotton field. The pilot said he saw the power lines just prior to striking them.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

the pilot's inadequate visual lookout and failure to maintain clearance from the power lines.

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Accident occurred Wednesday, April 20, 2005 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/25/2006
Aircraft: Bailey Lowing Loadster, registration: N8058Q
Injuries: 1 Serious.
The experimental airplane impacted a fence and a storage facility following a loss of engine power while on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern. The private pilot, who was the builder of the airplane, indicated he used a Volkswagen engine that he overhauled to power his airplane. According to the pilot, he wanted to break in the overhauled engine with 25 hours of operation in flight, but since the airplane was just built, he had to conduct a lot of high-speed taxi tests and takeoff and landings. Therefore, the pilot believed the engine did not receive an adequate break in. While on the airplane's fourth test flight, the pilot experienced a gradual loss of power while on downwind for the second approach. Post accident examination of the aircraft/engine by the pilot revealed scoring on the pistons, which was the only anomaly noted. The pilot was unable to test the carburetor due to damage sustained in the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

the loss of engine power for undetermined reasons.

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Accident occurred Monday, May 03, 2004 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/28/2006
Aircraft: Bell OH-58A+, registration: N397E
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
The helicopter collided with power lines and landed hard during a night autorotation following a loss of engine power. As the pilot initiated a turn, both he and the observer heard a loud boom. While they were discussing the origin of the boom, a second boom occurred followed by an immediate power loss. The pilot lowered the collective and entered an autorotation. During the flare, he realized he was going to overshoot the landing zone (LZ) and lined up with a street for landing. The pilot initiated a flare about 60 feet above the ground and felt a strong jolt with an increased rate of descent and a loss of main rotor rpm's as the helicopter collided with power lines. The helicopter landed hard from about 10 feet above the ground. Review of the maintenance logbooks revealed that the engine had been in service 5 months and 161 hours since a 1,750-hour inspection had been completed. An engine teardown was conducted. Various internal components had
excessive heat damage, carbon deposits, and metal splatter. There was a partial loss of airfoils for the number 1 turbine wheel. The gas producer (GP) turbine could not be manually rotated and was locked in place, with the second-stage turbine nozzle diaphragm fractured into several pieces. Paperwork obtained from the engine overhaul facility indicated that the second-stage turbine nozzle diaphragm had been replaced by machining out the old diaphragm and brazing in a new diaphragm. A metallurgical examination of the diaphragm revealed that it had separated from the main portion of the nozzle at the braze joints and it was also fractured 360 degrees around the trailing edge side of the diaphragm. The fracture surface revealed no pre-existing cracks, and the damage was determined to be consistent with tensile overstress. Both the leading and trailing edges of the braze alloy fill were measured. The leading edge side had a fill between 10 and 50 percent of
the joint width with an estimated average fill of 30 percent. The trailing edge side had a fill between 50 and 100 percent of the joint width with an estimated average fill of 75 percent. The diaphragm's manufacturer indicated that the braze alloy fill should fill the exposed extremities in a continuous line for the first 20 percent of the joint width, or 1.5 times the thickness of the thinnest member being joined, and have a minimum total coverage of 80 percent of the joint. The braze thickness of the accident diaphragm was measured to be at least 0.009-inch in one location. The manufacturer's specifications for the braze thickness was between 0.002 and 0.004-inches. Review of the overhaul facilities procedures for the repair of the diaphragm included requirements for visual and fluorescent penetrant inspection of the brazed joints after repair completion. The Safety Board metallurgist found that those methods of inspections were not capable of
detecting internal voids, unless the voids were connected to the surface. The manufacturer and the overhaul facility reviewed the history and processing of the diaphragm. It was noted that normally the overhaul facility used the hydrogen fluoride cleaning method to clean the majority of the diaphragms prior to brazing. However, the accident diaphragm and seven others were cleaned using the vapor degreasing method. Other diaphragms that had undergone the vapor degreasing method were retrieved and destructively examined. The results showed that these diaphragms contained cracking along the brazed joints. Several diaphragms that had undergone the hydrogen fluoride cleaning method were retrieved and destructively examined. They contained no cracks; however, the braze thickness was noted to be as large as 0.020 inches. As a result of the accident, the manufacturer revised their Parts Repair Procedures Letter (PRPL 2-D004) to reflect changes in the procedures
for brazing the second-stage turbine nozzle diaphragm, which included hydrogen fluoride cleaning, and immersion ultrasonic inspection and ultrasonic inspection during and after the brazing process. The overhaul facility rewrote their procedures to reflect the manufacturer's revised procedures.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

loss of engine power due to the separation of the diaphragm portion of the repaired second-stage turbine nozzle from the rim portion due to the use of an inadequate cleaning method to clean the joint prior to the braze repair during overhaul by the manufacturer's authorized maintenance center. Contributing to the accident was the lack of an inspection procedure that could verify that the joint met the braze fill requirements.

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Accident occurred Saturday, April 03, 2004 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/28/2004
Aircraft: Bell 47G-4A, registration: N7NB
Injuries: 1 Serious.
The helicopter experienced a loss of tail rotor control and collided with terrain. During an aerial application flight, the pilot heard a rattling noise from the aft end of the helicopter. He then lost tail rotor authority and entered a flat spin. The pilot attempted to make a run-on landing, but the helicopter continued to spin until it impacted terrain. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector examined the helicopter after the accident. He noted that the cross-over support tube near the aft end of the tail boom was missing. A crack was found on the tail boom left side frame tubes. Deposits of rust in the area suggests that the crack was a pre-existing crack. The inspector thought that this would have added excessive stress to the structure during turning maneuvers and caused the last spline coupling shaft to disconnect from the tail rotor gear box as the tail boom flexed. A 50-hour maintenance inspection was completed the day before the accident.


The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

a loss of tail rotor drive due to a disconnection of the drive shaft's splined coupling at the tail rotor gear box. The splined coupling to tail rotor gear box disconnection occurred as a result of tail boom flexing due to the combined effects of an uninstalled structural support tube and a crack in left side frame tubes. Inadequate maintenance inspection was a factor.

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Accident occurred Sunday, August 25, 2002 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/8/2005
Aircraft: Hispano Aviacion HA-200 SAETA, registration: N232DS
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
The ex-military jet trainer experienced a dual engine flame out during cruise flight and it collided with multiple obstacles during an attempted forced landing to a closed airport. The airplane had not flown for 5 years until a new owner bought it. After an annual inspection, the airplane was to be flown from Lewiston, Idaho, to Los Angeles, California, in two legs. The first leg from Lewiston to Minden, Nevada, used 352 gallons of fuel (full fuel is 367 gallons) and when the airplane arrived, the hydraulic gear extension system malfunctioned and the gear was extended using the emergency blow down system. The pilot then decided to continue on the second leg with the gear locked in the down position. Ninety minutes into the second leg the pilot became concerned about the amount of fuel remaining and was diverting to Bakersfield when both engines flamed out. The pilot was attempting a dead stick landing at a closed airport when the right wing struck the
ground and then the left wing struck a telephone pole. First responders noted about 80 gallons of fuel had spilled on the ground from the separated left tip tank. No fuel was found in the right tip tank or either of the fuselage tanks. The fuel system consists of two tip tanks; one aft fuselage tank, and a forward fuselage tank. The tip tanks, which feed only into the aft fuselage tank, are used by porting engine bleed air to the tanks through a pneumatic switch in the cockpit. The switch has positions for LEFT, RIGHT, BOTH and OFF. The forward and aft fuselage tanks are fed to the engines by conventional boost pumps. The proper fuel tank usage sequence is to select the aft fuselage tank while selecting and pressurizing both tip tanks, which then replenish the aft fuselage tank. When the fuel from the both tip tanks and the aft fuselage tank is used, then the forward fuselage tank is selected. Without at least one engine operating, bleed air is not
available to pressurize the tip tanks to use any fuel remaining there. No discrepancies were found during an examination of the airframe, engines, or the fuel system components, including the tip tank pressurization system, the boost pumps, or selector valves/switches. The passenger, who holds pilot and A & P certificates stated that the pilot was individually selecting the tip tanks (left or right) during flight and did not use the BOTH position.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

the pilot's improper fuel system management, which lead to fuel starvation, and a loss of engine power. A factor in the accident was the pilot's decision to continue on the second leg of the flight with the gear in the extended position, which increased the fuel consumption and reduced the aircraft's available range.

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Incident occurred Wednesday, June 27, 2001 in Bakersfield, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 2/25/2003
Aircraft: Beech A36, registration: N808NH
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.
During the landing approach on an instructional flight, the certified flight instructor (CFI) initiated a go-around and experienced restricted elevator control movement. The elevator control became partially jammed in a nose low and then a nose high position. Roll and yaw control was not affected. Using considerable force, the CFI maintained airplane control and landed without additional incident. Thereafter, the airplane was inspected. Evidence of mechanical binding to the elevator pitch control cables was noted. Specifically, a screwdriver was found wedged between the nose gear actuator retract rod and the elevator control cables beneath the forward spar cover, between and under the pilots' seats. When the nose gear retracted, the nose gear actuator retract rod moved the screwdriver against the elevator control cable resulting in binding. Upon removal of the screwdriver, the elevator operation was normal. Two days prior to the incident, a contract
mechanic had performed maintenance on the airplane. The maintenance required taking off the forward spar cover to allow removal and installation of a flap motor gearbox assembly and flap flex drives. Since this maintenance, the airplane had been operated 5.8 flight hours.


The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

During landing approach, mechanical binding of the elevator control cable occurred due to a contract mechanic's improper maintenance.

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Accident occurred Saturday, December 23, 2000 in BAKERSFIELD, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/6/2001
Aircraft: Cessna 140, registration: N72970
Injuries: 2 Minor.
During a forced landing precipitated by fuel starvation and a loss of engine power, the airplane collided with a fence and overturned. The engine stopped producing power about 2 miles from the airport, and the pilot thought he could make it to the airport. About 500 feet above the ground, he noticed the airport boundary fence. He felt he might strike it with the landing gear while in flight, so he decided to land short of the airport. After the airplane came to rest, the pilot saw fuel leaking from the inverted wing fuel tanks and evacuated the airplane. The pilot did not recall moving the fuel selector valve after landing. The fuel selector valve pointed to a position 20 to 30 degrees left of the right fuel tank position. It pointed to the middle of a placard that indicated right tank. However, a mechanic said he felt this position would not allow either tank to supply sufficient fuel to the engine. He observed a flexible detent that was installed to
ensure proper position of the fuel selector valve when the right fuel tank was selected. The flexible detent bent down and was not useable.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot's inadequate in-flight planning, fuel management, and inadequate remedial actions, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. The pilot made an off-field landing and collided with a fence.

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Accident occurred Friday, August 11, 2000 in BAKERSFIELD, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/1/2001
Aircraft: Barclay/Vincent MURPHY SR 2500, registration: N24VW
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 2 Serious.
During an emergency landing the left wing of the airplane struck an irrigation standpipe, and the airplane was destroyed in a post impact fire. The pilot reduced the power to descend and circle to land at a dirt airstrip. When he advanced the throttle to arrest the airplane's descent there was no corresponding power increase. He conducted the emergency procedures, but was unable to restart the engine. He overflew the airstrip and attempted an emergency landing in a cornfield. Review of the airplane's power plant logbook revealed that an overhauled engine had been installed on the experimental airplane in March 1999. The last entry was December 8, 1999, when the engine was test ran, and the fuel injection system was adjusted according to manufacturer's specifications. No further entries were found in the airframe or power plant logbooks. During the engine examination the throttle valve was found jammed in the closed position. Investigators also found the
idle speed stop screw backed off from the throttle shaft arm about 1/8 inch. No further mechanical anomalies were noted.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

Adjustment by other maintenance personnel of the idle speed stop screw. The idle speed stop screw was backed off from the throttle shaft arm, not allowing the butterfly valve to operate properly, which resulted in the butterfly valve remaining closed during a power input via the throttle control linkage during the approach to landing phase.

Bakersfield Municipal Airport Approach / Landing: