Brakett Field Airport, Laverne/Pomona, CA

Location:

History:

Brakett Field Airport Today:




Airport Services and Amenities:
Special Events:

Airport Area Accident History:
Accident occurred Friday, September 07, 2007 in La Verne, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 5/28/2008
Aircraft: Beech F33A, registration: N7298R
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
The pilot said that his approach to landing was normal, but he flew the base leg a little wide. He reported that his airspeed on short final approach was too fast, and the airplane ballooned during the flare. The airplane landed hard, porpoised, and landed hard again on its nose gear. The nose gear collapsed under the fuselage crushing the engine cowling and bending the keel beam.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

An improper flare during touchdown and an inadequate bounced landing recovery. Contributing to the accident was an excessive airspeed and an inadvertent porpoise.

= = =
Accident occurred Sunday, June 25, 2006 in La Verne, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/3/2006
Aircraft: Maule M-7-235C, registration: N209Z
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
The airplane veered off the runway after landing and nosed over. In the pilot's written statement, he said that he lost directional control after touchdown and was not successful in regaining control, so he let it run off the runway. The airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted. The pilot stated that there were no mechanical failures or malfunctions noted with the airplane or engine that would have precluded normal operation. Reported winds at the time of the accident were variable at 4 knots.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

the pilot's failure to obtain/maintain directional control on the landing rollout.

= = =
Accident occurred Thursday, December 22, 2005 in La Verne, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 8/29/2006
Aircraft: Beech F33A, registration: N3084N
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
A Beech F33A airplane impacted a Cessna 172N on short final after lining up on the wrong runway. According to the Beech pilot, he was cleared by the air traffic control tower for landing on runway 26R, but instead, accidentally lined up for runway 26L. On short final, the Beech pilot felt his airplane hit something and immediately heard the air traffic controller instruct him to go around. The pilot went around and eventually performed an uneventful landing. The Cessna student pilot was conducting his fourth solo flight and was practicing takeoffs and landings on 26L. He was cleared for the option on 26L and while on short final was overtaken by the Beech. The student pilot continued with an uneventful landing.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

the failure of the pilot to comply with his air traffic control clearance and line up for the proper runway, and his failure to maintain an adequate visual lookout, which resulted in his in-flight collision with the Cessna airplane.

= = =
Accident occurred Wednesday, March 31, 2004 in La Verne, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/30/2004
Aircraft: Piper PA34-200, registration: N74SA
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
The airplane collided with terrain while the pilot was attempting a go-around during a multiengine training flight. The certified flight instructor (CFI) turned the right engine fuel selector to the "off" position, in an effort to simulate an engine failure. The student followed the proper procedure by correctly identifying the failed engine and flew the airplane accordingly. On short final, about 100 feet above ground level, the airplane was high and not properly aligned with the runway. The CFI opted to make a go-around, and the student inputted full throttle on both engines. The student was unable to maintain airspeed and establish a positive rate of climb. The CFI communicated that he would take over the controls, and attempted to continue the go-around. The airplane would not climb and drifted to the right, across another runway. The airplane continued in a gradual decent, and the stall warning horn sounded. The right wing impacted terrain, and the
airplane spun around on the ground. The CFI stated that he had become distracted, and did not remember to turn the fuel selector back to the "on" position after the student had identified the failed engine. He thought this was the reason that the right engine did not respond to the throttle input during the go-around. The CFI reported no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

the CFI 's failure to correctly reconfigure the right engine fuel selector, resulting in a total loss of power to that engine. Also causal was the CFI's failure to maintain direction control of the airplane and an adequate airspeed, which led to the airplane stalling and colliding with terrain. A factor in the accident was the CFI's diverted attention.

= = =
Accident occurred Saturday, March 27, 2004 in La Verne, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 1/31/2006
Aircraft: Mitsubishi MU-2B-26A, registration: N81MF
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.
The twin turboprop airplane landed hard collapsing the nose gear, and causing substantial damage to the airframe. The pilot said that about 6-7 miles from the airport, in the terminal descent, he noticed the right engine torque meter read zero. This had occurred before, and the torque would come back if he manipulated the throttle. He continued the normal approach for landing. In the landing flare the airplane yawed right despite his corrective left rudder pedal input. The airplane landed hard, bouncing on the nose twice, breaking the nose wheel strut. It then slid about 2,000 feet down the runway. The ferry pilot, who flew the airplane to the repair facility after the accident, said that the engine power levers were consistently split throughout the entire ferry flight. In order to have the engine power perimeters matched, the right power lever had to be about 2 inches forward of the left one and this positional relationship was constant from flight
idle to full power. Maintenance records had no record of compliance to Mitsubishi Service Bulletin No. 097/73-001, which was published "to assure the engine and propeller rigging is adjusted within manufactures specifications and to prevent potential degraded flight handling qualities associated with the flight idle power being set asymmetrically or too low."

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

the pilot's failure to adequately compensate for an asymmetrical thrust condition and to maintain directional control during the landing flare. The owner/pilot's failure to comply with the applicable service bulletin concerning propeller/power control rigging was a factor.

= = =
Accident occurred Tuesday, December 11, 2001 in La Verne, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/24/2002
Aircraft: Piper PA-28-180, registration: N7844W
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.
The pilot entered the traffic pattern for landing on runway 26L and everything was normal. On short final approach the airplane was initially aligned with the runway centerline, the airspeed was 85 miles per hour, and the wing flaps were at the 25-degree extended position. During the landing flare, about 2 feet above ground level, the airplane yawed left. As the pilot attempted to regain directional control, the airplane stalled and touched down hard. Thereafter, it veered off the left side of the runway and collided with lights before coming to a stop about 100 feet left of the runway's edge. About the time of the mishap, a 30-degree, 7-knot crosswind existed. No gusts were reported.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot's failure to maintain directional control following his misjudged landing flare and hard touchdown.

Accident occurred Saturday, July 05, 2008 in Pomona, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 7/30/2008
Aircraft: Cessna 172F, registration: N8881U
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
The pilot said that when he started his cross-country flight, 2.4 hours had been flown by the airplane since the fuel tanks had been topped off. His first leg was 1.1 hours in length; he landed and spent approximately 1.5 hours on the ground. He was approximately 1.1 hours into his return flight, turning base for landing, when the engine lost power. He performed a forced landing to a large parking lot and impacted the fence on its perimeter during landing roll. The airplane's right wing lift strut was bent, and the right wing's leading edge was wrinkled and bent. No fuel was found in the airplane's fuel tanks.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

Fuel exhaustion due to the pilot's inadequate preflight planning and his failure to refuel the airplane.

= = =
Accident occurred Wednesday, August 17, 2005 in Pomona, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 9/14/2007
Aircraft: Piper PA-24-250, registration: N7342P
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious.
While on approach for the destination airport, the pilot reported engine problems, and attempted to land in a field short of the airport. During the forced landing, the left wing contacted the ground, and the airplane tumbled through an impact sequence. During the postaccident engine examination, investigators noted debris and corrosion inside the carburetor and the main jet passage. The airframe and engine inspection revealed no further mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. A Safety Board metallurgist examined the carburetor and debris/particles. The examination identified that the debris/particles were most likely a combination of lead and soil that had built up over time. The corrosion indicated prolonged exposure to water. The particles probably caused a restricted flow of air-fuel mixture in the main jet that eventually resulted in a reduction or loss of engine power once the particulate contamination had built up to a
significant amount. There were no entries in either the airframe or engine logbook indicating that the carburetor had ever been overhauled in its 46-year history. The carburetor manufacturer issued a service bulletin regarding the overhaul of the accident airplanes' carburetor. The recommended time for the overhaul was either at the engine manufacturer's time between overhaul, or every 10 years the carburetor was in service, whichever came first. While service bulletins are not mandatory, had the carburetor been inspected at the manufacturer's recommended intervals, the corrosion and debris may have been identified and source of the fuel system contamination corrected. Investigators noted that the airplane had not been equipped with a shoulder harness restraint system. The fatal injuries for the pilot and front seat passenger were caused by head and upper torso trauma associated with the upper body not being restrained during the impact sequence. The
airplane manufacturer had issued Service Bulletin No. 980, Shoulder Harness Installation, in 1995, for the accident make and model airplane. The pilot/owner had purchased the shoulder harness restraint system kit for his airplane, but had not installed them. The still packaged shoulder harnesses were found in the debris field by the investigation team.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

A loss of engine power during the landing approach due to fuel starvation caused by debris and corrosion in the carburetor assembly. A factor contributing to the accident was the failure of the owner to comply with the manufacturer's service bulletin regarding overhaul of the carburetor.

= = =
Accident occurred Tuesday, February 26, 2002 in Pomona, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/2/2004
Aircraft: Grumman American AA1B, registration: N1628R
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
The engine lost power in the traffic pattern base to final turn during a post maintenance test flight and the airplane collided with a building short of the airport. The carburetor was overhauled about 11 hours prior to the accident. During post overhaul flights an intermittent carburetor rich fuel/air mixture was noted in the idle circuit, which prevented the engine from idling below about 1100 rpm without fouling and quitting from excessive fuel. The carburetor was removed and sent back to the overhaul shop who removed the installed needle valve assembly and replaced it with another identical new assembly. The carburetor was then installed on the engine. When the main fuel shutoff valve was turned on, fuel began to run out of the carburetor. It was again removed and returned to the overhaul shop. The shop owner suspected that a stuck or hanging up float may have been also been the problem. Since the carburetor was equipped with an Advanced Polymer
float, which is larger than either the original brass or older style composite float, the shop owner carefully adjusted the float for lateral clearance between the float and the bowl wall, and, between the float clip and the needle valve. After several attempts on the test bench to achieve a stabilized fuel level, the carburetor finally passed. The pilot (an A&P) picked up the carburetor from the shop on the day of the accident, installed it, then flew the airplane for about 15 minutes. The accident happened on the second test flight. Post accident examination of the engine revealed sooted spark plugs typical of a rich fuel/air mixture. The carburetor was functionally tested by mounting it on a tilting test fixture. A trace amount of fuel was observed leaking from the discharge nozzle. When the fixture was rotated to a bank angle, fuel flowed freely from the nozzle. Tapping on the bowl stopped the flowage. Operational testing disclosed that the
carburetor was operating at an excessively rich setting at idle speed. Disassembly disclosed that the Advanced Polymer float was clean and intact with no sign of damage. The float setting and bowl clearance was good. The needle valve seat assembly was inspected and measured and found to meet specifications. The float retractor clip and needle valve shoulder clearance was measured about 0.005-inch. The pivot pin/shaft that hinges the float assembly was found to be "tight" in the inside diameter of the Polymer Float hinge points; however, the float and shaft combination did rotate freely in the float bracket. The manufacturer's service manual (and incorporated overhaul instructions) were examined. There are three types of floats which can be installed. The originally designed floats are hollow brass chambers. The second type, no longer in production, consists of floats constructed out of composite materials. The third type is the Advanced Polymer floats,
which are physically larger that either the brass or composite floats. With either the brass or composite floats, a typical 0.081-inch clearance exists between the float and the bowl chamber. The increased size of the polymer float reduces the float to bowl wall clearance to a typical 0.031 inches. The original sections of the service manual address the original brass floats and calls for a post reassembly minimum clearance of 0.005-inch between the float valve seat shoulder and the float valve retractor clip. Instructions E-955 (dated 03/18/99) have been incorporated into the manual and cover the installation of the polymer floats. This document requires the assembler only to "Insure that clearance exists between the float valve seat (shoulder) and the float valve retractor clip." There is no published minimum clearance limit. During final assembly, the carburetor fuel bowl and throttle body go together blind and without the ability to see the final
internal clearances. Float clearance and height settings are critical to the proper metering of fuel proportional to airflow through the venturi of the carburetor. Any float drag against the wall of the bowl assembly could feasibly disturb the critical balance. The investigation measured several sources of free play in the carburetor removed from the accident airplane with a dial indicator. About 0.015-inch was measured rotating the bowl cover and fuel bowl halves with just snug bowl screws. A source of horizontal float centering free play not mentioned in E-955 is in the float hinge that is attached with screws to the bowl cover; the hinge can slide about 0.028-inch from either screw. Index marks were added by the investigator to each float tip, and the total sideways free play of the hinge measured about 0.229-inch at the float tips. The accident float flange was coated with a bead of black transfer material to test for rubbing on the bowl walls. The
float was then reassembled into the accident carburetor bowl and throttle body assemblies following the service manual and kit instructions E-955. The carburetor was then rotated in various positions. Disassembly revealed black transfer markings on the inside of the bowl walls. The arc of float travel on the hinge point can bring the Polymer float against the bowl wall when the lateral movement is adjusted while installing the float bracket. An improperly centered float that rubs on the bowl wall may affect the float buoyancy and seating of the needle valve. The float retractor clip attaches to the needle valve. Without positive clearance from the needle valve seat shoulder a loss of float buoyancy or pressure to seat the valve can occur. Without proper seating of the needle valve due to float horn to bowl contact, positive fuel shutoff would be unlikely.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

a total loss of engine power due to an excessively rich mixture setting in the carburetor. The overly rich operation of the carburetor was due to the overhaul shop's failure to obtain the proper clearance between the float and chamber walls, which allowed the float to rub and hang up. The overhaul shops failure to achieve the correct clearances was due in part to the inadequacy of the manufacturer's overhaul instructions concerning installation of the Advanced Polymer Floats.







Brakett Field Airport Approach / Landing: