Lopez Island Airport: Lopez, Washington

Airport is located 3 miles south of Lopez.

The pilot reported that during cruise flight, the propeller rpm continued increasing despite his numerous attempts to reduce the propeller rpm. As the pilot reduced power, he heard a loud bang followed by a "significant trail of white smoke pouring over the wind screen" and a loss of engine power. The pilot initiated a forced landing to a nearby road that appeared to have no vehicle traffic. The pilot stated that he extended his approach to landing due to a vehicle turning onto the road. During the landing roll, the left wing struck a street sign and subsequently struck "two or three large wooden fence posts that were hidden in the bramble of blackberry bushes” that resulted in structural damage to the empennage and the left and right wings. Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector revealed that the oil filler cap was unsecured to the oil filler neck. Oil residue was observed along the left side of the airframe
and engine cowling. Further examination of the engine revealed that the two aft nuts securing the propeller governor to the crankcase mounting pad were loose. Oil residue was observed within the surrounding area of the propeller governor. About 1 quart of oil was observed within the oil sump. Review of maintenance logbooks revealed that the engine was recently disassembled and inspected due to a propeller strike. Following the propeller strike inspection, the propeller governor was reinstalled. The pilot reported that the accident flight was the first flight following the propeller strike inspection and that he verified the oil level was adequate during his preflight inspection.
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While en route to the destination airport, the pilot heard the engine generate a loud "bang," as though something had shattered internally. The engine subsequently experienced a total loss of power. The pilot maneuvered the airplane to a pasture where the airplane collided with a fence during the landing roll. According to the engine logbooks, the last engine annual inspection had been performed about 6 months and 124 hours prior to the accident. The left magneto had been replaced about 3 months and 54 hours prior to the accident. A teardown inspection of the engine disclosed that the left idler gear was damaged with several teeth missing and one tooth wedged between the forward face of the gear and crankcase. A detailed metallurgical examination of the left idler gear revealed that it failed due to fatigue. Fatigue features were observed at two locations, and both had initiated in the radius between a gear tooth flank and the root. The gears that were
engaged with the idler gear were intact and mostly undamaged. The fracture surface at one fatigue location on the left idler gear was much more reflective than the other. A reflective surface, indicative of a rubbing motion of one fracture surface against another, indicates a misalignment of the meshing gears to produce the motion. The fracture surface at the other location was duller, indicating that little or no rubbing occurred, consistent with the fracture occurring after the first fracture with the rubbed surface. The second fracture propagated until the material below the gear teeth could no longer support the stresses of operation and the portion of the gear located between the two fatigue fractures departed the left idler gear. The fatigue was probably initiated by abnormal contact between the left idler gear and the other mating gears, with the relatively recent installation of the left magneto gear being suspect as the likely source of the
initiating stressors.
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The pilot was conducting a Title 14, CFR Part 91 personal flight in a Cessna 180G airplane that nosed-over during takeoff. During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) shortly after the accident, the pilot stated that he was attempting to avoid geese on the private airstrip when the accident occurred. In a written report, dated May 26, 2007, the pilot stated "taxi down the runway - goose ran out in front - jammed on brakes and tailwind gust - flipped me over." The airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage. The pilot did not report any preaccident mechanical anomalies. The pilot reported that his last medical, third class, was issued on October 21, 2003. The medical carried a limitation that stated "not valid for any class after October 31, 2005."
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In a written statement the pilot reported that the airplane "drifted" to the left of runway centerline during the visual approach and collided with a runway sign.
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An airline transport pilot was receiving instruction in tail wheel landings in her personal airplane (she had been flying it on floats in Alaska for the last five years). The flight instructor said this was the first tail wheel landing for the day, and it was the second day of their recurrent training. The student said that after she landed, she released pressure on the flight controls like she did during a float-airplane landing on water. During the landing roll, the airplane ground looped to the left, and a rib and spar in the right wing were bent.
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According to the pilot, during his preflight inspection, he determined the fuel aboard the airplane by looking at the wing fuel sight gauges. The left and right fuel sight gauges indicated 45 gallons and 55 gallons, respectively, which was "sufficient" fuel for the planned 1 hour 50 minute cross country flight. During the flight, both engines lost power, and the pilot ditched the airplane in ocean waters about 8 nautical miles short of the destination airport. Review of maintenance records indicated that about 4 months before the accident, fuel leaks in the airplane's left and right wings were repaired by replacing the right hand outboard and left hand inboard leading edge fuel cells. This repair involved replacement of both wing fuel sight gauges. According to one of the two mechanics who performed the work, when the sight gauges were removed to replace the tanks, he and the other mechanic marked the sight gauges "R" and "L" and made hash marks on the
mounting plates. When they reinstalled the sight gauges, they used the hash marks to put them back in their original positions. Interviews of the airplane's owner and another mechanic provided conflicting information about whether the fuel sight gauges had been repositioned by this mechanic following completion of the fuel cell repair work. Review of the Pilot's Operating Handbook revealed that the fuel sight gauges are to be used for partial filling or off-loading of fuel and only when the gauge reads within the calibrated area between 40 and 60 gallons. When the airplane was examined, the fuel tanks were empty. The right wing fuel sight gauge indicated 55 gallons. The left wing fuel sight gauge initially indicated in the cross hatched area; but after it was jiggled, it indicated 43 gallons. When the fuel sight gauge access plates were removed, it was noted that black felt tip pen marks (hash marks) on the fuel sight gauge mount plates and on the fuel
sight gauges did not align. Further examination revealed that the gauges were installed improperly, such that the floats were restricted in their range of travel by the wing structure. When the gauges were rotated to a position where the hash marks aligned, the gauge floats had a full range of travel, and both gauges indicated in the cross hatched (unusable) area. Information provided by the airplane's owner and a trip book found in the airplane indicated that at the time the pilot conducted his preflight and at the time of the accident, the airplane had been flown 3.9 hours and 5.5 hours, respectively, since its last refueling. Using the fuel burn rate provided by the owner of 30 gallons per hour, the airplane would burn 165 gallons of fuel in 5.5 hours. Further, in the 3.9 hours flown by the owner, the airplane would burn 117 gallons. Subtracting 117 gallons from the airplane's usable fuel capacity of 166 gallons indicated that when the pilot
preflighted the airplane, it contained about 49 usable gallons of fuel with each wing holding about 24.5 usable gallons of fuel. If the sight gauges had been properly installed, they would have read in the cross hatched (unusable) area. The airplane was equipped with left and right fuel quantity indicators mounted in the instrument panel. According to the owner, these indicators did not work properly and several maintenance facilities had worked on them without resolving the problem. He and other family members who flew the airplane (including the accident pilot) used the sight gauges to determine the amount of fuel aboard the airplane for partial fuel loads.